Goldstein, R. “Holistic Similarities Between Quine and Wittgenstein.” Philosophical Investigations, July 26, 2023.

Goldstein, R. “Epistemic Disadvantage.” Philosophia, January 6, 2022.

 Sarnecka, Silva, Vickers, Coon, Goldstein, & Rouder “The Writing Workshop,” Innovative Higher Education (2022),


Goldstein, R. “Reconceptualizing Civic Competence in the Digital Age,” in Snow, N.E., & Vaccarezza, M.S. (Eds.). (2021). Virtues, Democracy, and Online Media: Ethical and Epistemic Issues (1st ed.). Routledge.

Goldstein, R. “You are Only as Good as You are Behind Closed Doors,” in Precollege Philosophy and Public Practice, vol. 2, no. 1 (2020). DOI: 10.5840/p42020348.


Goldstein, R. Patriotic Education in a Global Age by Randall Curren & Charles Dorn, in Educational Theory, vol. 69, no. 5 (2019).


Goldstein, R. B., & Vickers, D. (2022, December 16). “The writing workshop”: Increasing representation in philosophy. Blog of the APA.

Goldstein, R. “Jewish Injustice: on the role of women witnesses.” Tikkun, May 2, 2022.


“Meaning-Constitutive Hinges”

“The Aim to Transmit Knowledge: a commitment to epistemic uniformity”

“Distinguishing Two Epistemic Frameworks: Comparing Quine to Wittgenstein”

“A Stereotypical Hinge Framework”

“Narrowing the Philosophy Gender Gap by Building Skills and Community,” co-authored with Darby Vickers, Philosopher

“Equity in the School of Physical Sciences at UCI,” co-authored with Dr. Mu-Chun Chen, Physics and Astronomy


Title: “On (Mal) Functioning Belief Systems”
(Supervisors: Professor Annalisa Coliva & Professor Duncan Pritchard)
Summary: This dissertation explores harms that can arise from warranted thinking routines, specifically those that occur in contexts like medicine and education. I first develop the concept of epistemic disadvantage to capture contexts in which there is epistemic harm due to the asymmetrical relationship between knowers, yet that asymmetry is pertinent to the practice of knowledge. This inquiry leads to considering how beliefs systematically function in evidential reasoning practices. I argue that two prominent doxastic frameworks–a Quinian and a Wittgensteinian framework–support a version of confirmation holism, the view that justification for empirical beliefs entails appreciation of the full system of beliefs. One upshot of incorporating the epistemological systems of Quine and Wittgenstein is that these frameworks can give a convincing account for how thinking routines influence evidential reasoning. I develop such an account in the third chapter of the dissertation by employing a Wittgensteinian framework to show how a heuristic like stereotyping plays a normative role in cognitive processes. I conclude that heuristics like stereotyping are justified except in contexts where harm occurs.